Assuming identical firms, a linear market demand function and a single factor of production, labour, we analyse the existence and stability of a homogeneous Cournot duopoly facing imperfect competition in both product and factor markets. We establish the possibility of antisymmetric equilibria separated by a unique symmetric equilibrium. Under certain assumptions on the wage function we are able to demonstrate local stability of the unique symmetric equilibrium, and its global stability under the assumption of a convex reaction function. 
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INTRODUCTION
Since Theocharis (1959), many economists have analysed the stability of the Cournot oligopoly equilibrium under various assumptions. A summary of the main results up to 1976 has been given by Okuguchi (1976) and up to 1990 by Okuguchi and Szidarovszky (1990) . All these results, however, have been obtained on the basis of cost functions for oligopolistic firms assumed to be facing perfect competition in factor markets. The cost function approach is appropriate only if firms engage in productive activities in perfectly competitive factor markets . Okuguchi (1993 Okuguchi ( , 1995 was the first to formulate the Cournot Oligopoly model where product and factor markets are simultaneously imperfectly competitive and established the existence of a unique Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony equilibrium 22 CARL CHIARELLA and KOJI OKUGUCHI without recourse to the cost function approach. In this paper we will examine the stability properties of the equilibrium for his model after preliminary analysis of its existence. In so doing we will assume that the number of firms is two and that there is one factor. We will furthermore assume that the firms are symmetric. Initially it might appear that our symmetric Cournot duopoly-duopsony has only a symmetric equilibrium but we will show that this is not the case. Indeed our model may have a symmetric equilibrium as well as multiple asymmetric ones. Novshek (1984) , Okuguchi (1984) and De Fraja (1994) have pointed out the possibility of existence of asymmetric equilibria for the symmetric Cournot oligopoly where all firms have an identical cost function. Okuguchi and Chiarella (1994) have analysed the stability properties of asymmetric equilibria for symmetric Cournot oligopoly in perfectly competitive factor markets.
THE MODEL
We adopt the framework of Okuguchi (1993) with the special case of identical firms, linear market demand function, and most importantly, we assume a single factor of production, namely labour.
Thus each firm has a production function given by xi=Lc, 0<J3<1, i=1,2, (1) where xi and Li are respectively output of, and labour employed by, firm i. Setting
we assume a linear inverse demand function which we write as
We assume the wage rate is given by w(L), w'(L) > 0 where L--.1,i+ L2 and at subsequent points in our discussion we will invoke one or other of the following two assumptions about the wage function:-
This assumption states that the marginal labour cost of each firm is a nondecreasing function of the labour input of the rival firm.
ASSUMPTION W2.
w(L) = yL8 , y>0 , 0 _1 .
We observe that assumption wt is satisfied by this flexible functional form which imposes a convex wage function. The profit function of firm i is given by 
We note that
. (6) 3
. REACTION FUNCTIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
Setting marginal profit of firm 1 to zero we obtain the equation that determines 
Then equation (7) may be written
Similarly firms 2's profit maximising condition may be rewritten a-2bx2 = g(x2, xi) . (9b) Equations (9) Proof From equation (8) we may calculate the partial derivatives (using subscripts 1, 2 to denote partial derivatives with respect to first and second arguments)
We note that under assumption wt we may assert
for all x >0, y > O. Consider the equation a-2by=g(y, x) , (13) which defines the reaction function y = G(x) . (14) Differentiating (13) implicitly and rearranging we find dy---= -g2(Y, x) (15) ox (2b + gr(y, x)) which in light of (12) implies that G' <0 under assumption wt i.e. the reaction function is downward sloping over its domain.
We then note that G (0) 
We note that under assumption W2 we may assert
for all x>0, y>O. Furthermore gi1(x,y)>0, (16b) under assumption W2 provided /3 < 1/2. However for 1/2 < /3 < 1, g 11(x, y) is difficult to sign in general. Differentiating implicitly once again we obtain
The coefficient of d2y/dx2 on the LHS is clearly negative, however from equations (13) we see that the term on the RHS is of indeterminate sign (even under assumption W2), so we need to consider the possibilities of G" > 0, G" < 0 and G" being of both signs over its domain. Hence we can sketch in Fig. 1 all the possible configurations for the reaction function. The cases in which either G" > 0 or G"<0 clearly from geometrical <_____ xi -G(x2) Fig. 1(a) . G" < 0.
xi a a 2b a 2b~--x~-G(x2) Fig. 1(b) . G">O. We observe that
We note also that
and that
It follows that H(y) intersects y at least once from above as shown in Fig. 2 . However multiple equilibria remain a possibility at this stage since we are not able to tie down the sign of H" without further restrictions. We first prove a proposition about symmetric equilibria: PROPOSITION 2. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium (z, x) which is characterised by the property 0 < H'(z) < 1 .
Proof. We note that a symmetric equilibrium point is determined by xi =HO 1) , X2=H
We set The assumption w' > 0 suffices to guarantee (5> 0, whilst assumption wt guarantees p>0. It is then a simple matter to deduce that 0501< 1(24)
It follows from equation (19) that H'(x)< 1. It has already been demonstrated that H'(x) > 0. If follows that the equilibrium is unique. A consequence of proposition 2 is that at a symmetric equilibrium H(y) cannot intersect the line y from below in Fig. 2 We note in order to obtain a pair of antisymmetric equilibria there will have to be multiple intersections of graphs of y and H(y). Given the properties of the function H already demonstrated multiple equilibria can only occur in odd numbers (we exclude consideration of tangency intersections which are structurally unstable). Fig. 2b shows the case of three equilibrium points. We state the following proposition concerning the disposition of symmetric and antisymmetric equilibria: PROPOSITION 3. Antisymmetric equilibria (if they occur) are separated by the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Proof Our proof is based on geometric reasoning. First we observe that the properties of the function G ensure that equilibrium points must lie within the square [0, a/2b] x [0, a/2b]. Secondly observe that antisymmetric equilibria by their definition lie on either side of the 45° line within this sequence. It follows that antisymmetric equilibria are separated by the unique symmetric equilibrium.
Thus in the case of these equilibrium points as in Fig. 2b , the pairs (xi, x3), (x3, xi) are the antisymmetric equilibria and the pair (x2, x2) is the symmetric equilibrium. For higher order multiple equilibria (i.e. 5, 7, 9 etc) the middle pair will always be the symmetric equilibrium, as illustrated in Fig. 2c for the case of 5 equilibria.
We can assert the following proposition concerning multiple equilibria:
PROPOSITION 4. Multiple equilibria of order 3, 7, 11, ... cannot occur.
Proof Suppose multiple equilibria of order 3 do occur. Then given the properties of the function H it must be the case that at the (middle) symmetric equilibrium H'> 1. This is so since at the middle equilibrium point the function However we have shown in proposition 2 that at a symmetric equilibrium H' < 1. Hence equilibria of order 3 would imply a contradiction and cannot occur.
Similar reasoning applies to equilibria of order 7, 11 etc.
It does not seem possible to rule out multiple equilibria of order 5, 9, 13, ... etc without imposing conditions on the function which are difficult to interpret economically. We leave as an open research question the conjecture that no multiple equilibria of any order can occur under the assumption w'(L) > 0. We have not been able to generate any counter examples using graphical computer packages and the assumption W2.
Allowing increasing marginal product of labour would certainly introduce the possibility of multiple equilibria. This also remains a topic of future research.
DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT AND STABILITY
We consider the adjustment process whereby each firm adjusts to desired output at some finite speed of adjustment i.e. (25b) where k> O.
We consider here only the case satisfying; ASSUMPTION W3. The function w(L) satisfies conditions guaranteeing that the function H only intersect the 45° line once.
Hence we are considering the case of a unique symmetric equilibrium. In Fig. 3 we sketch the phase plane of the dynamical system (25), and its vector field. The direction arrows of the vector field suggest global stability of the equilibrium. We are able to prove some precise propositions about stability of the equilibrium. Hence the result follows.
• PROPOSITION 6. Under the additional assumption that G"(x) > 0 for 0 < x < b/a, the equilibrium point of the dynamical system (25) is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof We note first that G'(0) = ----1, 2 which combined with the assumption G"(x) > 0 and the property G'(x) < 0 implies
for all x E (0, b/a). The Jacobian of the dynamical system (25) at a general point (xi, x2) e (0, b/a)
The result then follows by the Olech (1963) theorem.
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CONCLUSION
In Section 2 we have formulated the Cournot duopoly of identical firms facing imperfect competition in both the product and factor markets. In Section 3 we have established the possibility of the existence of both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria which exhaust the set of possible equilibria. We have further shown that the symmetric equilibrium is unique and will separate asymmetric equilibria if these occur. In Section 4, we have proven the local stability of this unique equilibrium assuming restrictions on the wage function which guarantee a unique symmetric equilibrium. Under the further restriction that the reaction function of each firm is convex we have established global stability of this equilibria.
Our analysis has been conducted using a linear inverse demand function, however we know that it is possible to obtain stability of the Cournot equilibrium under general demand functions containing the linear demand function as a special case, so we feel that this assumption may not be too restrictive. Furthermore, we have assumed away capital as a variable of the production function. In this sense what we have achieved in this paper is quite modest. However, we believe that we have provided a framework and useful reference point for further analysis of the dynamic properties of the Cournot equilibrium in imperfectly competitive product and factor markets. Further research should introduce the second factor of production, capital. It is also important to consider the effect on stability of the various expectational schemes discussed in Okuguchi (1976) . We know from Chiarella and Khomin (1996) in the case of the standard (i.e. firms facing perfect competition in factor markets) Cournot model that this easily leads to the loss of local stability accompanied by Hopf bifurcations which indicate a fairly complex nonlinear dynamic behaviour.
